An Agent-based Modeling Framework for Sociotechnical Simulation of Water
  Distribution Contamination Events by Shafiee, M. Ehsan & Zechman, Emily M.
 
 
 
 
An  Agent-based  Modeling Framework  for 
Sociotechnical Simulation of Water Distribution 
Contamination Events 
 
 
M. Ehsan  Shafiee and Emily M. Zechman 
 
North Carolina State University 
 
 
 
Abstract. In the event that a bacteriological or chemical  toxin  is intro- 
duced  to a water  distribution network, a large  population of consumers 
may become exposed to the contaminant. A contamination event may be 
poorly predictable dynamic process due to the interactions of consumers 
and  utility managers during  an event. Consumers that become  aware  of 
a threat may  select  protective actions  that change  their  water  demands 
from  typical demand patterns, and  new  hydraulic conditions can  arise 
that differ from conditions that are predicted when demands are consid- 
ered  as exogenous  inputs. Consequently, the  movement of the  contami- 
nant plume  in the pipe network may shift from its expected trajectory. A 
sociotechnical model  is developed  here  to  integrate agent-based models 
of consumers with  an  engineering water  distribution system  model  and 
capture the  dynamics between  consumer behaviors and  the  water  distri- 
bution system  for predicting contaminant transport and public exposure. 
Consumers are simulated as agents  with  behaviors defined  for water  use 
activities, mobility, word-of-mouth communication, and  demand reduc- 
tion,  based  on a set of rules  representing an agents  autonomy and  reac- 
tion to health impacts, the environment, and the actions  of other  agents. 
As consumers decrease  their  water  use, the  demand exerted on the  wa- 
ter  distribution system  is updated; as the  flow directions and  volumes 
shift  in response,  the  location  of the  contaminant plume  is updated and 
the  amount of contaminant consumed by each  agent is calculated. The 
framework is tested through simulating realistic  contamination scenarios 
for a virtual city  and  water  distribution system. 
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1    Introduction 
 
Drinking  water  distribution systems are critical  infrastructure systems.  Because 
they  provide  potable  water  to a large population of consumers  from centralized 
sources,  they  create  vulnerability in a community to both  accidental pathogen 
outbreaks and  intentional attacks (1).  For  example,  accidental introduction of 
pathogens  may occur due to pump  failure, pipe breaks,  and polluted  source wa- 
ter,  and  intentional attacks may  be initiated at  tanks,  treatment plants,  and 
 
 
 
 
exposed water  mains (2). Historical  outbreaks due to contaminated water  have 
caused severe public health  consequences, including hospitalization and death  of 
vulnerable  segments  of the population (3). 
 
 
The  public  health  consequences  of an outbreak or attack do not  depend  on 
the  characteristics of the  contaminant  intrusion   alone.  Instead, the  decisions 
and  behaviors  of human  actors  as they  interact with  the  pipe network  can in- 
fluence the number  of exposed consumers  and the propagation of a contaminant 
plume.  The  U.S. Government Accountability Office (1) recommended  that sys- 
tem vulnerability may be reduced  by changing  human  actions  and interactions, 
including strengthening the communication between actors who distribute infor- 
mation  during  an event and  training utility  operators for outbreak mitigation. 
Woo and Vicente (4) and Vicente and Christoffersen  (5) have described  the wa- 
ter  contamination outbreak as a sociotechnical  system,  which is a system  that 
is characterized by strong  interactions between  social and technical  factors  that 
govern  the  emergent system  performance.  Optimization of a technical  system 
without consideration of social interactions tends  to  degrade  the  performance 
and  increases  the  unpredictability of the  system.  Glouberman (6) investigated 
an outbreak in Walkerton, Ontario, and emphasizes  that the occurrence  and ef- 
fects of a water  contamination event cannot  be attributed to one culprit  alone. 
The  study  suggests  that attempts to  strengthen a system  by  focusing on one 
component  alone may  ignore  events  and  interactions that can  have  important 
stabilizing  or destabilizing effects. While  the  analysis  of Walkerton focused on 
the interactions that increase the vulnerability of the system and that 
influence detection  of the event, the interactions between human  actors and the 
infrastruc- ture  system as the event unfolds can also influence the transport of 
contaminant in the network  and determine the emergent public health  
consequences.  For ex- ample, as a contaminant spreads  through a system,  
consumers may become sick and stop consuming water or change their water use 
due to warnings from public health  officials or their  peers. At the same time,  a 
water  utility  may take action to mitigate  the event after the detection  of the 
contaminant. The utility  may use both outreach activities, such as broadcasting 
boil water orders, and operational procedures,  such as closing valves and  
opening hydrants. The  actions  taken  by consumers  and  decision-makers  may 
cause hydraulic  conditions  in the  network to fluctuate outside of expected 
ranges and, therefore,  the contaminant plume to deviate  from a predicted  
propagation. The unpredictability introduced through consumer  interactions 
may create  difficulties for utility  managers  in identifying the most effective 
responses plans to protect public health. 
 
 
Simulation  studies typically consider water distribution pipe networks  in iso- 
lation  and  neglect  dynamic  interactions among  the  contaminant in  the  pipe 
network  and  consumer  demand  decisions. A Complex  Adaptive  System  (CAS) 
approach is developed  here  for the  water  distribuiton contamination event.  A 
CAS  is  characterized by  a  set  of interacting agents  that influence  emergent 
system  properties  through dynamic  feedback  loops (7; 8; 9; 10).  Agent-based 
 
 
 
 
modeling (ABM) is a computational model for simulating  the actions  and inter- 
actions of autonomous agents in a CAS to evaluate  the collective effect on system 
properties  (11). Agents are modeled to receive information about their  environ- 
ment,  have goals, and select actions  to change the environment and meet goals. 
Additionally, an  agent can  receive information from other  agents  and  interact 
with them.  The  ABM approach has been applied  in water  supply  management 
in  limited  contexts  to  explore  decision-making  strategies for increasing  water 
supply  capacity  and  to  simulate  consumers  and  their  reactions  to  water  pric- 
ing (12; 13; 14; 15; 16). Preliminary research  has explored  simulation  of water 
distribution contamination through coupling  water  distribution system  simula- 
tion  with  ABM,  and  this  approach was applied  to  evaluate  the  public  health 
consequences  of contamination events  for a small virtual  city of 5000 residents 
(17; 18; 19). The study  presented here makes a new contribution to threat man- 
agement research  by comparing  public  health  consequences  that are  predicted 
through the  ABM methodology  to results  that are obtained from an engineer- 
ing model  alone.  This  research  demonstrates and  quantifies  the  change  in the 
predicted  hydraulic  conditions  in the network  that the decentralized decisions of 
consumers  can produce.  While utility  managers  and  their  reactions  to mitigate 
the consequences of water  events can significantly  impact  the consequences of a 
contamination event, this study  explores consumer behaviors,  and utility  actions 
are not  included  for simulation  in the  present study.  The  framework  developed 
and  presented here  introduces   advances  in  behavioral  simulation   beyond  the 
previous studies.  Improvements to the simulation  of human  behavior  include in- 
corporation of established  models for a word-of-mouth mechanism,  simulation  of 
a demographically heterogeneous  population, improved  simulation  of exposure, 
and utilization of real data  for simulating  the expected protective actions of con- 
sumers during contamination events. This study applies the ABM approach for a 
virtual  case study,  which is a municipality of 150,000 residents.  The case study  is 
realistic  and includes a large population of consumers  and a complex water  dis- 
tribution system. A new metric is used to evaluate  the location of a contaminant 
plume in a network over a time series, and results show that for large doses of po- 
tent chemicals, the  hydraulics  in a network  are reversed  in flow directions  from 
normal  operating  conditions.  In  preliminary studies,  ABM  was  proposed  and 
implemented as an approach to address  water  contamination events;  this study 
emphasizes  the importance of ABM for studying  water  events  as sociotechnical 
systems by comparing  it with the models that are traditionally used for analysis. 
 
 
 
2    Agent-Based Modeling Framework 
 
A  set  of actors,  including  end-use  consumers,  water  utility   managers,   public 
officials, the  mass media,  and  public  health  agencies,  interact through sharing 
information when a contaminant  is introduced in a water  distribution system, 
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Individual  actors  and organizations choose from a set of 
potential actions,  based  on their  interpretations of the  event,  and  these actions 
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Fig. 1.  Interactions among  actors  and  the  water  distribution system  in a water  distri- 
bution system  contamination event. The study described here captures the interactions 
among  consumers and  the  water  distribution model,  as shown  by the  shaded  box. 
 
 
can directly  or indirectly  change  hydraulics  in the  pipe network.  For  example, 
water  utility  managers  may  first  become  aware  of contamination through un- 
usual  water  quality  data  that is collected  by  an  early  warning  sensor  system 
or through consumer  complaints. Water  utility  managers  may implement oper- 
ational  strategies to  control  the  propagation of the  contaminant plume  in the 
water  distribution system.  Public  officials may  alert  residents  about  potential 
or confirmed contamination by implementing, for example,  a boil water  notice. 
Consumers  may comply with  notices  and  warnings  by implementing protective 
actions,  such  as  avoiding  contact with  tap  water,  and  alerting  peers  about  a 
threat. As a result of these interactions, hydraulic  conditions  in the water distri- 
bution  system may fluctuate due to direct  operations, such as opening hydrants 
and closing values, and due to reductions  in consumer  demands. 
 
A modeling  framework  is described  here to capture the  interactions among 
consumers  and  the  water  distribution system  by coupling  a water  distribution 
simulator  EPANET (20) with  an ABM system,  AnyLogic (21). Consumers  are 
represented as individual  agents,  who adapt their  behavior  based  on the  infor- 
mation  they receive from the water  distribution system and other  agents.  When 
the simulation  begins, consumer demands are represented as aggregated demands 
that are exerted  on the  water  distribution system  at  nodes, and  EPANET  cal- 
culates  the flow volumes, flow directions,  and water  quality  within  the pipe net- 
work. The  simulation  proceeds  at  discrete  time  steps  for hydraulic  calculations 
in EPANET, and  at  each  time  step,  water  quality  information is passed  from 
the water  distribution system  model to the agents.  Consumers  are simulated to 
ingest water, and once a consumer has accumulated a critical dose of the contam- 
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inant,  the  consumer  is flagged as exposed and  responds  to exposure  by passing 
information to other  consumers  and reducing  water  usage. Changes  in demands 
are translated to the water distribution simulation, and the hydraulic  conditions 
for successive time  steps  are calculated  by EPANET. In this  way, the  feedback 
loop between  the consumers  and the water  distribution system  is established. 
 
The procedure  that consumers  use to select behaviors  is represented through 
a set of rules, which include if-then relationships and probabilistic functions.  The 
behaviors  that are included  in the simulation  are the timing  and volume of wa- 
ter ingestion; changes in water  usage through protective action strategies; travel 
among nodes; and  word-of-mouth communication among consumers.  Agent at- 
tributes and rules of behavior  are described  in the following sections. 
 
 
 
2.1     Demographic information 
 
Agents  are initialized  with  diverse  characteristics to represent a heterogeneous 
population. Data  is used  from  a study  that reports  statistics for age, gender, 
and weight, for the U.S. population, as grouped into 11 discrete  age groups (22) 
(Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2.  Demographic information for the  U.S. population shown  as the  average  for an 
age  group  (a)  Age  (22)  (b)  Weight (22)  (c)  Volume  of ingested   tap  water  (22)  (d) 
Employment (23). 
 
 
 
 
2.2     Volume and Timing of Daily Ingestion 
 
Each  agent is initialized  with a specific pattern for using and consuming  water, 
based  on gender  and  age group,  using the  distribution shown in Fig.  2c. Two 
approaches, a fixed approach and  a probabilistic approach, are used and  com- 
pared  to simulate  the volume of water  that each agent consumes each day. The 
fixed approach simulates  that each agent ingests the  expected  value of the  dis- 
tribution, or 0.93 L. The probabilistic approach uses an exponential distribution 
to assign random  volumes  to different consumers  based  on the  mean  value  for 
each age group.  A value  for the  daily  consumption volume  is assigned  to each 
consumer  using Eqn. 1, which is the inverse form of an exponential distribution 
function  (24): 
 
 
v = −vm ln(1 − p)                                                 (1) 
 
 
where v is the volume of water,  vm is the mean volume associated  with each age 
group in Fig. 2, and p is a probability that is randomly  generated between  zero 
and one. 
A consumer  agent is assigned five times during  a day when it consumes  tap 
water. The fixed approach divides the volume of water that each consumer drinks 
uniformly  among five times:  7:00, 9:30, 12:00, 15:00, and  18:00 (25). The  prob- 
abilistic  approach was developed to specify probability density  functions  for the 
times at  which a consumer  takes  three  daily meals, depending  on the  timing  of 
previous  meals (Fig.  3) (26).  Minor  meals are taken  at  the  mid-point between 
major  meals to simulate  five daily ingestions. 
 
As agents  ingest contaminated water,  the mass of contaminant in an agent’s 
body accumulates. Once an agent has ingested  a critical  dose, he is considered 
exposed. The critical  dose varies for different contaminants. 
 
 
 
2.3     Water Demand Behaviors and Self-Protective Strategies 
 
Simulation  of water  end-use behaviors  is based on data  collected by the Ameri- 
can Water  Works  Association  (2008). This  study  reports  that 70% of the  total 
residential  water  demand  for U.S. households  is used for indoor  activities, and 
these  indoor  water  end-uses  are  grouped  into  six categories  based  on the  ulti- 
mate  appliance:  washing clothes (15.4% total-water use), toilet  (18.5%), shower 
(11.6%),  faucet  (11.2%),  leakage  (9.8%),  and  other  miscellaneous  indoor  uses 
(3.5%) (27). Consumer  agents  are simulated with  the  ability  to suspend  water 
use for four of these indoor activities, including washing clothes, showering, using 
the faucet, and miscellaneous indoor uses, which compose 41.7% of a household’s 
total  water  use. 
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Fig. 3.  Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) represent  the  times  at which  three 
major meals are taken. M1, M2, and M3 are the times for Meals 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
(a)  CDF  for M1 and  M2, (b)  CDF  for M3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once consumers  become exposed  to  a contaminant or are  alerted  by peers 
about  a  threat, they  may  adjust   their  demand  decisions  and  change  typical 
consumption of tap  water  for indoor  uses. Results  of a survey  about  expected 
behaviors  in a water  contamination event are used to better represent how con- 
sumers make decisions about  reducing  water  use during  a contamination event. 
The  survey  was conducted  to explore how respondents may change  nine water 
activities  related  to indoor use in response to information about  water  contam- 
ination  (28). Respondents were asked to quantify  how likely continuing  certain 
water  use activities  would be to endanger  their  health  when drinking  water  has 
been contaminated. Survey results (Fig. 4) were used to calculate  the probability 
that a consumer  agent will continue  each activity, and  each water  activity  cor- 
responds  to one of the four water  end-use groups listed above (washing  clothes, 
showering,  using the  faucet,  and  miscellaneous  indoor uses). When  a consumer 
agent selects to alter  its water  use behavior,  the probability of suspending  each 
use is evaluated independently, and the total  reduction in total  water  demand  is 
computed. 
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Fig. 4.  Probabilities for suspending water activities once a consumer is alerted about 
an event, based  on results  reported by (28) 
 
 
As agents  change their  behaviors,  the base demand  of each hydraulic  node is 
updated at each time step: 
 
bd0  =     i=1  (1 − RFi ) t                K              × bdt                                                          (2) 
 
 
where bdt  is the original base demand  at a node at time step t; K is the number 
of consumers  located  at  the  node  at  time  step  t; RFi  is the  reduction factor 
decision made by consumer i at the node; and bd0  is the new base demand  at the 
node. The parameter RFi varies between 0.035 and 0.417 to represent the reduc- 
tion in demand  corresponding  to the end uses that are discontinued for an agent. 
 
 
 
2.4     Mobility 
 
During  a  contamination event,  consumers  may  move  across  the  boundary of 
a contaminant  plume  as they  travel  to work, places of business,  or residences, 
and may become exposed to the contaminant by drinking  water  at any of these 
locations.  The  percentage  of employed  adults,  distinguished by age group  and 
gender,  was reported by  the  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics for cities  in the  U.S. 
(23) (Fig.  2d) and  is used in simulating  mobility.  To simulate  the  movement of 
consumers  in a municipality, each  agent is assigned  a residential  node,  a non- 
residential   node,  the  time  at  which  the  agent leaves  its  residential   node,  the 
length  of time  spent  traveling,  and  the  time  it  leaves the  non-residential node 
to  return to  its  residential node.  Employed  agents  spend  approximately eight 
hours  at  non-residential nodes,  and  unemployed  agents  visit  commercial  nodes 
or remain  at residential  nodes during  a day. The travel  time between  two nodes 
is based on the Euclidean  distance  and is subtracted from the time a consumer 
 
 
 
 
spends at a residential  node. 
 
Data  describing  demand  patterns and  the  time  series of the  population at 
each node are used to establish  mobility  patterns that are consistent  with  the 
water  distribution model. Demand  patterns that specify the daily time series of 
nodal demand  are obtained from the input  data  for the hydraulic  model. These 
patterns are normalized  and  multiplied  by the  maximum  population at  a node 
to derive the  number  of consumers  that should be at  a node at  each time  step, 
and these numbers  are used to assign mobility  parameters to agents. 
 
 
 
2.5     Word-of-Mouth Communication 
 
During  hazardous events,  individuals   may  receive  information through  many 
varied  channels,  and  word-of-mouth communication can significantly  affect the 
behavior of a population (29). Victims may identify their own unsafe actions and 
encourage  family members,  friends,  peers,  and  colleagues to  discontinue  water 
use activities. Once consumers  experience exposure  symptoms, they  may adopt 
protective behaviors  and warn others  about  the danger. 
 
While  a few models exist  for simulating  communication among  peers (e.g., 
30),  a cluster  model  was developed  for simulating  communication specifically 
during  an emergency event (31) and was selected for implementation within  the 
ABM framework. The cluster approach is similar to a small world network model 
(32), but  the cluster  approach specifies a unidirectional flow of information and 
specifies relatively  less communication among agents.  Each agent is specified as 
an  information isolate  or a member  of a cluster.  In  a cluster,  individuals  are 
assigned  one of several  roles, including  an  original  source,  intermediate  mem- 
bers,  and  ultimate receivers.  Original  sources are typically individuals  who are 
informed about  current events,  communicate with many individuals,  and have a 
strong influence in their immediate  community. A warning message can originate 
from the original source or the intermediate actors  in each cluster  (Fig. 5). The 
time  it takes  to pass each message is assumed  for this  study  as one step  of the 
hydraulic  simulation  (typically 15 minutes  to 1 hour). Upon receiving a message, 
agents  in a cluster  wait  one time  step  before passing  the  message to  the  next 
receiver. 
 
 
 
3    Illustrative Case Study: Mesopolis 
 
Mesopolis is a virtual  city that was developed  for threat management research 
(33) and  is used to demonstrate application of the  ABM framework  for a real- 
istic case study.  The  city is modeled with an historical  development, beginning 
in the  1800s as a harbor  town  and  growing to include  residential, commercial, 
and  industrial areas,  in addition  to  a naval  base,  an  airport, and  a university 
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Fig. 5.  Framework for sending  and  receiving  messages  within  a cluster  of individuals 
(31).  Arrows  show the  direction of messages  passed  from senders  to receivers. 
 
 
(Fig.  6). A river  that flows through the  city  from south  to north  provides  the 
main  source of fresh water.  Water  is withdrawn from the  river at  a location  13 
miles south  of the city and pumped  through a main pipe to the southern edge of 
Mesopolis, where the pipe branches  to deliver water to an East  Treatment Plant 
and  a West  Treatment Plant. The  West  Treatment Plant is an older plant and 
provides  the  majority of the  water  demand  for the  west side of the  city, which 
is separated from the east side by the river. The East  Treatment Plant supplies 
water  for the eastern  side of the city, and,  in addition, for a large portion  of the 
western  side during  peak  demands.  A skeletonized  hydraulic  simulation  model 
represents the  network  using  1588 nodes,  2058 pipes,  one reservoir,  13 tanks, 
and 65 pumps.  Four  different demand  patterns are specified, which include res- 
idential,  commercial,  industrial, and naval  demands.  Commercial  nodes include 
churches, schools, grocery stores and malls. Demands at industrial nodes are typ- 
ically constant through a 24-hour  period,  corresponding  to three  8-hour  shifts, 
while the  demands  at  other  types of nodes increase  during  the  day and  reduce 
to nearly zero at night.  Based on the demands  simulated in Mesopolis, the pop- 
ulation  is calculated  as 146,716 persons,  and  the  distribution of the  population 
among node types is shown in Table 1. The mobility  patterns are established us- 
ing the demand  patterns and population distribution among nodes (Fig. 7). For 
the word-of-mouth simulation, the cluster  size is set at 15, with one information 
isolate, one original source, two intermediate receivers, and 11 ultimate receivers. 
 
 
 
4    Contamination Events 
 
A large  number  of potential intentional attacks and  accidental outbreaks can 
threaten the water  quality  in a distribution system.  A set of both  biological and 
chemical  contaminants are  explored,  including  E. coli, Norwalk-like  virus,  and 
arsenic.  The  characteristics of the  contamination events  are based  on a risk as- 
sessment study,  which reports  the location  and timing  for the worst case events 
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Fig. 6.  Schematic of the  Mesopolis  water  distribution system 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Distribution of the  Mesopolis  population among  different types of agents 
 
Types  of Consumers Population 
Employed consumers 86,776 
Employed consumers at commercial nodes 26,034 
Students 19,457 
Employed consumers at industrial nodes (over 3 shifts) 21,186 
Unemployed consumers who visit commerical nodes 18,552 
Unemployed consumers remaining at residential nodes 6,755 
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Fig. 7. Percentage of consumers at demand node types. The percentage is based  on the 
aggregated maximum population for each type of demand node and  demand patterns. 
 
 
 
 
that could occur in Mesopolis and the maximum  number  of exposed consumers 
that would be expected  for each event (34; 35). The  risk assessment study  was 
conducted  to evaluate  the severity of event without considering consumer actions 
or reductions  in demands.  A hydraulic  water  distribution simulation  model was 
coupled with  an engineering  model with  an optimization methodology  to iden- 
tify  worst-case  threats, which  are  characterized by the  time  that the  contam- 
inant is injected,  the  duration over  which  the  contaminant  was released,  and 
the  hydraulic  demand  multiplier (the  hydraulic  demand  multiplier   represents 
the  fluctuation of demands  with  seasons).  To  estimate   loading  values  for the 
bacterial contamination, probability distributions were created  to describe  the 
likelihood of any load of bacteria injected  to a system,  based  on literature that 
describes  bacterial outbreaks. Due to  a lack of occurrence  and  documentation 
about  wide-spread  arsenic  contamination, two loading  events  were created  to 
represent low-impact  and  high-impact cases. A selected  number  of events  that 
were identified  through the risk assessment are used as simulation  scenarios for 
this study  (Table  2), including intrusions  of E. coli, the Norwalk-like virus, 75 kg 
of arsenic,  and  300 kg of arsenic  at  the  East  Treatment Plant and  West  Treat- 
ment Plant, for a total  of eight contamination events. 
 
For each of the eight contamination events,  the value for the critical  dose for 
each contaminant is calculated  using exposure information and models available 
in the literature. The critical  dose represents the dose at which a person experi- 
ences symptoms. The critical  dose (infectious  dose) for E. coli and Norwalk-like 
are nine and 15 cells, respectively  (36). The arsenic critical  dose varies based on 
the weight of a victim  (37): 
 
dc  = 5.0 × 10−8 wm                                                               (3) 
 
 
 
where dc  is the arsenic critical dose in kilograms, and wm is the consumer’s body 
weight in kilograms. For the initial set of simulations, all consumers are assigned 
a weight of 70 kg, with a corresponding  arsenic critical  dose of 3.5 mg. 
 
 
5    Modeling Scenario 
 
Five  modeling  scenarios  are  constructed to  represent increasing  levels of com- 
plexity  in the model (Table  3). Model 1 represents the static  engineering model, 
where  all consumers  drink  water  at  the  same  time  each  day  and  of the  same 
volume (0.93 L), remain  at residential  nodes without moving, are exposed after 
ingesting  3.5 mg of arsenic,  and  do not  adapt their  demands  or communicate 
with  other  consumers.  Model 2 includes  probabilistic simulation  of the  volume 
and  timing  of consumer  tap  water  ingestion,  though  consumers  still remain  at 
residential  nodes and  maintain water  consumption. Model 3 incorporates daily 
mobility  of consumers in the network.  Model 4 includes a feedback loop between 
the  consumers  and  the  network,  where  consumers  decrease  demands  based  on 
 Pathogen or Demand Injection Injection
Event Type Location Toxic Multiplier Starting Ending
 Chemical (Season) Time Time
 
A
c
c
i
d
e
n
t
a
l
 
West
Treatment 
 
Plant 
E. coli            0.85 (F/W)       Day  1,      Day 3,        36M doses 8am            7pm 
Norwalk-like      0.90 (F/W)       Day  1,      Day 4,        38M doses 8am            6pm 
East
Treatment 
 
Plant 
E. coli            0.80 (F/W)       Day  1,      Day 2,        74M doses 12am           1am 
Norwalk-like      0.95 (F/W)       Day  1,      Day 3,        91M doses 12pm          12pm 
 West
Treatment 
 
Plant 
Arsenic              0.60 (W)            Day  1,      Day 2,            75 kg 12pm           2pm 
Arsenic              0.60 (W)            Day  1,      Day 2,           300 kg 6pm           12am 
East
Treatment 
 
Plant 
Arsenic              0.60 (W)            Day  1,      Day 1,            75 kg 6pm            7pm 
 
I
n
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Accidental pathogen outbreaks and  intentional attacks used  for  contamination events,  adopted from  (35).  Seasons  include 
Fall/Winter (F/W) and  Winter (W). 
 
Contaminant 
Load 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arsenic              0.65 (W)            Day  1, 7pm 
Day  1, 
12am 
 
300 kg 
 
 
 
 
exposure,  and  hydraulic  conditions  are  altered  dynamically. Model 5 includes 
the  adaptive behaviors  of Model 4 and,  in addition, consumer  agents  commu- 
nicate  and  receive warnings  through the  word-of-mouth mechanism  to  update 
their  demands. 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Modeling  scenarios  for the  ABM framework 
 
 
Model Mechanisms 
Model 
Static                                             Dynamic 
1          2            3            4            5 
Ingesting Volume and Times Det. Prob.      Prob.      Prob.      Prob. 
Mobility No        No Yes         Yes         Yes 
Adaptation of Consumers No        No          No Yes         Yes 
Word-Of-Mouth Communication No        No          No          No Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
6    Results 
 
6.1     Total Exposure 
 
For  each  modeling  scenario,  the  simulation  duration has  been set  to  8 and  10 
days,  according  to  the  type of event,  to  provide  a baseline  for comparing  the 
modeling  scenarios.  The  models  described  here  do not  simulate  the  responses 
and  actions  of the  utility. Without the  interactions of the  utility, such as open- 
ing hydrants to flush contaminated water,  consumers continue  to use water until 
a contaminant has been completely  consumed,  which occurs after 8 and 10 days 
for the intentional and accidental events, respectively.  As shown in the following 
results,  new dynamics  arise in the simulation  after 6 days due to the adaptations 
of the  population. Future and  on-going research  will explore the  interaction of 
utility  actions  during  a contamination event (38). 
 
Each  of the  five models  was  executed  for 10 random  trials,  for a  total  of 
50 simulations   for  each  one  of the eight  contamination events.  Fig.  8 shows 
the  results  for the  contamination events  (E.  Coli outbreak, Norwalk-like  virus 
outbreak, 75-kg arsenic  event,  and  300-kg arsenic  event) at  the  West  and  East 
Treatment Plant. Results  are presented as the  average  number  of exposed con- 
sumers,  and the error bars show the range of the number  of exposed consumers 
over 10 trials.  The  stochasticity that is introduced by the  probability distribu- 
tions  in the  modeling  of the  behavior  of agents  results  in a small  variation in 
the predicted  number  of exposures. For all models and contamination scenarios, 
the  range  of exposed  consumers  varied  within  a range  of 300-600. Compared 
to the  total  number  of exposed consumers,  the  range  of variation is small due 
to  the  size of the  contamination events,  which  introduce   a  large  load  of the 
 
 
 
 
contaminant. In addition, for many  simulations, the  contaminant remains  for a 
significant amount of time  at  many  nodes,  which gives the  consumers  at  those 
nodes repeated opportunities to consume contaminated water.  Though  there  is 
variation in mobility  and ingestion,  over time, similar numbers  of consumers  are 
exposed across the set of 10 realizations for each unique combination of contam- 
ination  event and model. 
 
 
The static  model, Model 1, predicts the highest number of exposed consumers 
across all models for the contamination events at the East  Treatment Plant. For 
each of the four events, Model 2 predicts  between 40-50% the number  of exposed 
consumers as predicted  by Model 1. Model 2 includes stochasticity in the volume 
of water  ingested  by each consumer  and in the timing  of consuming water.  As a 
result,  the  range  of the  contaminant mass ingested  by each consumer  is wider, 
and  while  some consumers  ingest  much  more  of the  contaminant, fewer con- 
sumers ingest contaminant above the critical  dose. Mobility  (included  in Model 
3) decreases the predicted  number  of exposed consumers  by a small percentage, 
as more  consumers  travel  away  from contaminated nodes  and  do not  ingest  a 
critical dose. Model 4 includes adaptive behavior,  and because consumers change 
their  water  demand  once they have become exposed, there  is more contaminant 
that remains  in the network  for a longer time period, and additional consumers 
are exposed. Model 5 shows a small decrease in the predicted  number  of exposed 
consumers,  as consumers  who are  warned  through the  word-of-mouth mecha- 
nism before they  become exposed are protected from the contaminant. 
 
 
The  results  for events  at  the  West  Treatment Plant show different patterns 
for the predicted  number  of exposed consumers  when compared  to events at the 
East  Treatment Plant. Model  1 predicts  the  highest  number  of exposed  con- 
sumers for all events except  the 300-kg arsenic event.  Model 2 shows a decrease 
(40  to  65% reduction compared  to  Model  1)  in  the  predicted   number  of ex- 
posed consumers,  but  mobility  (simulated in Model 3) increases  the  number  of 
consumers  who are  exposed.  This  is because  for events  initiated at  the  West 
Treatment Plant, the  contaminant  is confined  to  a small  part  of the  network 
in larger  concentrations, so that the  most  significant impact  of mobility  is that 
the  number  of individuals  from the  eastern  side of the  city  visit  the  contami- 
nated  area  during  the  day  and  ingest  contaminated water,  becoming  exposed. 
Including  the  adaptive nature of consumers  in Model 4 increases  the  number 
of exposed consumers,  as the  contaminant lingers in the  system  without being 
consumed  by exposed  consumers.  The  word-of-mouth mechanism,  included  in 
Model 5, protects a small percentage  of the total  population, which is seen when 
compared  to Model 4. 
 
 
The  300-kg arsenic  event at  the  West  Treatment Plant is significantly  dif- 
ferent in predicted  consequences.  Stochasticity in drinking  patterns (Model  2) 
does not decrease the number  of exposed consumers  to the same extent as other 
events.  Mobility  increases  the  number  of exposed consumers  above the  number 
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Fig. 8. Average  number of exposed consumers due to contamination events  at the East 
Treatment Plant (left  column,  white  bars)  and  West  Treatment Plant (right column, 
dark bars)  over 10 trials  for each model. Error  bars show the range of exposed consumers 
over 10 trials. Contaminant Events are  (a)  E.coli,  (b)  Norwalk-like, (c) 75-kg arsenic, 
(d)  300-kg arsenic. 
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predicted  by Model 1, producing  a greater  increase  than  for any  of the  other 
events  or models. The  adaptive behavior  of consumers  as they  reduce  their  de- 
mands  increases  the  number  of exposed  consumers  further.  The  impact  of the 
word-of-mouth communication is greatest for this  event,  and  reduces  the  num- 
ber of exposed consumers  by approximately 10,000. These results  are explained 
by  the  high  contaminant load  of 300 kg. This  event produces  contaminant in 
concentrations above 1.5  mg   lingering for 19 hours at 67% of the terminal  nodes 
in the  western  part  of the  city.  Most  consumers  at  nodes  on the  western  side 
of the  city  consume  a critical  dose of arsenic  due to the  high concentration in 
the  water.  The  number  of the  residential  consumers  in the  western  portion  of 
the  city  is 37,463, and  the  number  of individuals  predicted   as  exposed  using 
Model 3 is an  average  of 38,865, indicating  that mobility  results  in the  expo- 
sure of more consumers though  they do not reside in the western part  of the city. 
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Fig. 9. Fig. 9. Results for one simulation of the  75-kg arsenic  event at the  West  Treat- 
ment Plant. (a)  Contaminant concentration profile at Node A and  the  timing  of con- 
sumer  ingestions for Model  1 and  Model  3 (b)  Contaminant concentration profile  at 
Node A and  the  number of consumers located  at the  node,  simulated using Model 3. 
 
 
 
In  all  of the  events  at both  treatment plants,   there  is a  notable  decrease 
in predicted exposed  consumers  between  Models 1 and  2. The  decrease  when 
 
 
 
 
stochasticity is introduced to consumer  behavior  is heightened  for these  events 
because the contamination events were originally designed through optimization 
to have the most impact for the deterministic model, Model 1 (35). The impacts 
of optimizing  events  for simplified modeling is further  explored  through Fig. 9. 
Fig. 9a shows the  profile of contaminant  concentration at  Node A when 75 kg 
of arsenic  is introduced at  the  West  Treatment Plant (the  location  of Node A 
is shown  in Fig.  6). The  timing  for consumer  consumption is simulated using 
Models  1 and  3, and  the  bars  show the  average  over  10 simulations  for each 
model.  Model  3 represents the  ingestion  timing  and  volume  for Models  3, 4, 
and  5, because  stochasticity in consumer  water  activities  and  mobility  are  in- 
cluded  in these  models. Model 1 predicts that all 1071 people located  at  Node 
A drink water  on the second day at 12:00 P.M.,  3:00 P.M.,  and 6:00 P.M.,  when 
the  contaminant is at  high concentrations at  that location.  Model 3 predicts  a 
more  uniform  distribution of ingestions  at  Node A. Model 1 predicts  that the 
consumers  at  Node A drink  a total  of 796 liters  of water,  and  Model 3 predicts 
598 liters of water  are ingested  during  the 34-hour window shown in Fig. 9a. 
 
Fig. 9b demonstrates the mobility  of consumers,  which is included in Models 
3, 4, and 5. Consumers  move throughout the city, and as a result,  there are only 
a few hundred  consumers  at Node A when contaminant concentrations are high. 
As a result,  less than  300 consumers  drink  water  at Node A when the contami- 
nant concentration is at the highest value. For the 10 simulations  of each model, 
the  volume  of ingested  water  at  Node A is an  average  of 262 liters  (standard 
deviation  of 29 liters)  for Models 3 and 4, and an average of 237 liters (standard 
deviation  of 20 liters)  for Model 5. These volumes are much lower than  the vol- 
ume of water  that is predicted  to be ingested  at  Node A using Model 1. These 
results  demonstrate that a worst-case  scenario  that is designed  using vulnera- 
bility  analyses  and a static model may not be the worst-case  scenario when the 
complexities  of adaptations and interactions in an event are taken  into account. 
 
 
 
6.2     Dynamics of Exposure 
 
Fig. 10 shows the dynamics  of consumer  exposure  for four of the contamination 
events,  including  300-kg arsenic events  and Norwalk-like outbreaks at the West 
Treatment plant and the East  Treatment Plant, as predicted  by all five Models. 
For  each  event,  Model  1 shows a stepwise  behavior  in the  increasing  number 
of exposed  consumers,  which  is due  to  the  uniformity  of consumer  behaviors. 
All consumers  in the  population drink  at  the  same five events  during  one day, 
and  each  consumer  ingests  the  same  volume  of water,  though  the  amount of 
contaminant that is ingested  varies  due to diverse  contaminant concentrations 
throughout the  pipe network.  For  Model 1, consumers  are counted  as exposed 
only after each of the five daily drinking events, leading to the stepwise behavior. 
For the remaining  models, there is stochasticity in the timing of ingestion events, 
leading  to a more continuous  increase  in the  number  of exposed consumers.  In 
 
 
 
 
simulating  the consequences of the Norwalk-like event (Figs. 10c and 10d), Mod- 
els 2-5 predict  that some consumers  are exposed to the  critical  dose while the 
contaminant is still being released,  in contrast to Model 1, which predicts  that 
consumers  become exposed only once the entire  load has been injected  into the 
system.  This  is due  to  the  variability in the  amount of ingested  water  among 
consumers  in Models 2-5; some consumers  drink  large enough  quantities to be- 
come exposed much earlier in the event. 
 
Fig. 11 shows for these same events the time series of consumers  who are ex- 
posed, consumers  who are warned  through word-of-mouth communication, and 
consumers  who change their  water  use, simulated using only Model 5. The  line 
representing the number  of consumers  who change their  water  use generally fol- 
lows the  exposed consumers;  as more consumers  are exposed,  more consumers 
are warned.  In addition, consumers  who are warned also warn others.  The num- 
ber  of consumers  who change  their  water  use does not  exceed 70,000 for any 
of the simulations  due to the limitations imposed by the word-of-mouth mecha- 
nism. When an agent becomes exposed, the warning  goes to agents  in the same 
cluster,  but  does not spread  to other  clusters. 
 
 
 
6.3     Effects of Adaptive Consumer Behaviors on  System Hydraulics 
 
The  hypothesis  of this  work is that as consumers  change behaviors  in response 
to  the  contaminant, the  hydraulic   conditions  in  the  network  are  altered.   To 
illustrate differences among  the  models in the  predicted  movement of the  con- 
taminant, the  Coincident  Population Plume  Index  (C P P ) is introduced here. 
The  CPP  represents the  coincidence,  or coinciding  location  and  timing,  of the 
population and  the  contaminant plume.  The  C P P  assesses the  fraction  of con- 
sumers who are located at nodes where the contaminant concentration is greater 
than  zero: 
 
 
C P P (t) = 
Pi=n       pi (t)        
    i=1    1−δ[Qi (t)]   
P 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
where  C P P (t) is the  Coincident  Population Plume  Index  at  time  step  t of a 
simulation;  pi (t) is the population at node i and time step t; n is the total  num- 
ber of terminal nodes in a water  distribution system;  Qi (t) is the  contaminant 
concentration at node i at time t; δ(x) is the Dirac delta  function  (39); and P is 
total  number  of consumers  in the model. The function  δ[Qi (t)] takes  on a value 
of infinity when the contaminant concentration is zero, and a value of zero when 
the contaminant concentration is greater  than  zero. 
 
The C P P  index is computed for the E. coli outbreak at the East  Treatment 
Plant (Fig.  12a).  The  E. coli outbreak is selected  because  the  duration of the 
contaminant  intrusion  is shorter  than  the  Norwalk-like  virus  event  and  shows 
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Fig. 10.  Time  series of the average  number of the exposed  consumers over 10 trials  us- 
ing Models 1-5. Contaminant loading profile is shown as shaded  area.  (a) 300-kg arsenic 
event at the  West  Treatment Plant, (b)  300-kg  arsenic  event at the  East  Treatment 
Plant, (c) Norwalk-like at the  West  Treatment Plant, and  (d) Norwalk-like at the  East 
Treatment Plant. 
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Fig. 11.  Time  series of the  average  (over  10 trials) number of the  exposed  consumers, 
consumers who are warned, and consumers who change their  water  use, simulated using 
Model 5. (a) 300-kg arsenic event at the West Treatment Plant, (b) 300-kg arsenic event 
at the  East  Treatment Plant, (c)  Norwalk-like at the  West  Treatment Plant, and  (d) 
Norwalk-like at the  East  Treatment Plant. 
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Fig. 12.  Time  series of Coincidence  Population Plume  Index  for a) E.coli outbreak at 
East  Treatment Plant and  b) 300-kg arsenic  event at West  Treatment Plant simulated 
using Models 1-5. 
 
 
 
 
dynamics  of the  C P P  clearly. Models 1 and  2 predict  the  similar behaviors  for 
the C P P  index, and the C C P  value drops off during  days 6-8, as the contami- 
nant leaves the system.  Diurnal  patterns are present during days 6-8, due to the 
filling and  draining  of a tank,  which  removes  the  contaminant from the  pipes 
during  the  night and  re-introduces the  contaminant to  the  pipes  as  the  tank 
drains  during  the  day.  For  the  first six days  of the  simulated event,  Models 3, 
4, and 5 show similar values for C P P , indicating  that the adaptive behaviors  of 
the consumers  do not influence the location  of the contaminant plume. Later  in 
the event,  during  days 6-8, the location  of the plume varies widely among these 
models. Specifically, Model 3 shows lower C P P  values, as residents  continue  to 
consume  water  and  the  contaminant, and  contaminant leaves the  system.  For 
Model 4, some consumers  change their  demands  so that the contaminant lingers 
in the system longer, and for Model 5, as additional consumers change demands, 
the contaminant stays  in the system and covers a larger portion  of the network. 
 
 
The  C P P  index is also computed for the  300-kg arsenic  event  at  the  West 
Treatment Plant (Fig.  12b).  Models  1 and  2 (plotted as  one line in  Fig.  12) 
show the same behavior  for the value of C P P , as the location of consumers  and 
the  movement  of the  plume  is identical  between  the  two  models.  The  number 
of consumers  at  contaminated nodes does not  change  for Models 1 and  2 over 
the first six days of the event (Fig. 12b). The behavior  of the C P P  for Model 3 
shows an oscillating  pattern, due to the daily movement of consumers,  as many 
travel  to the western  side of the city during  the daytime, and back to residential 
nodes on the eastern  side of the city during the nighttime. The mobility  patterns 
among  Models 3, 4, and  5, are  the  same,  but  the  behavior  of the  C P P  index 
for Models 4 and 5 depart from that of Model 3. For Models 4 and 5, the C P P 
is lower than  the  C P P  for Model 3. The  adaptive behaviors  of the  consumers 
(changes  in demands  for Model 4, and  changes  in demands  in addition  to  the 
word-of-mouth mechanism  for Model 5) have influenced the water system to the 
extent that the predicted  location  of the plume shifts. As shown in Fig. 13, and 
described  in the  following paragraph, Model 5 predicts  that the  plume  moves 
to the  central  part  of the  city, where nodes are  non-residential and  fewer con- 
sumers are present,  during  the later  part  of the simulation  when demands  have 
been adapted. Model 5 predicts  a lower value for C P P  during  the last few days 
of the simulation. 
 
 
The 300-kg arsenic event at the West  Treatment Plant demonstrates strong 
dynamic  behaviors  that lead to dramatic changes in the predicted  contaminant 
plume,  as consumers  are  exposed  early  in the  event and  adapt their  demands 
quickly. The hydraulics  in the system is impacted  to such an extent that the nor- 
mal direction  of flow in the  system  is reversed.  Fig. 13 depicts  the  total  spread 
of the contaminant plume, as predicted  by Models 1 and 5. Under Model 1, the 
contaminant is constrained to the  western  side of the  city.  Under  normal  con- 
ditions,  water  flows from east  to  west  to  meet  peak  demands;  using  Model 5, 
hydraulic  conditions  are changed  to such an extent that water  flows from west 
kg 
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Fig. 13.  300-kg arsenic  event introduced at the  West  Treatment Plant as predicted by 
(a)  Model  1 and  (b)  Model  5. Contaminated terminal nodes  indicated by  large  dark 
circles.  Terminal nodes  that remain  clean  throughout the  event  are  shown  as  small 
dark  circles. 
 
 
to east due to the number  of consumers  that have reduced  their  water  demand, 
and the contaminant plume reaches a greater  number  of nodes. This mechanism 
breaks  what  has been identified  as a hydraulic  barrier,  or a division in the pipe 
network  over which water  does not flow or flows uni-directionally under  normal 
operating  conditions.  This  case demonstrates the  utility  of the  ABM approach 
to identify  unexpected emergent dynamics  that may occur due to adaptive be- 
haviors. 
 
 
 
7    Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In each of the five Models, a few assumptions were made and can impact the sim- 
ulation  results.  For example,  consumers  are simulated to recognize and respond 
quickly to symptoms  of exposure and to notify peers immediately. Zechman (40) 
conducted  a sensitivity analysis  of these  parameters for a small water  network. 
Further studies  are  needed  to  tune  these  behaviors  to  represent realistic  be- 
haviors.  A sensitivity analysis  is conducted  here to evaluate  the  impact  of two 
modeling parameters, critical dose and the word-of-mouth framework,  on public 
health  consequences. 
 
 
 
7.1     Critical Dose for  Arsenic 
 
The  initial  modeling  assumed  that all consumers  have a body weight of 70 kg, 
and  as a result,  all consumers  respond  to a critical  dose of 3.5 mg (or 0.05  mg 
body  weight) of arsenic.  There  may  be considerable  uncertainty in the  size of 
arsenic dose that causes symptoms  to appear  for any individual. Three additional 
cases are considered here, where consumers respond to critical doses of arsenic of 
0.035, 0.050, and 0.071  mg   body weight, and consumer agents are initialized with 
weights that are generated probabilistically to better represent a heterogeneous 
kg
kg
 
 
 
 
population. Critical  doses represent the upper  bound,  lower bound,  and median 
values of exposure  (37). The  age group and  gender of each agent (initialization 
of these parameters is described above) translates to a mean value for the weight 
of a consumer  based  on the  U.S. representative statistical distribution (shown 
in Fig. 2). To generate  the weight of each consumer,  an exponential distribution 
function  is used (Eq.  5) and  ensures  that for a large sample,  the  average  mean 
of the weight of the sample matches  the average  for the original data  set: 
 
w = −wm ln(1 − p)                                                (5) 
 
 
 
where w is a weight, wm is the mean weight of each age group in Fig. 2, and p is a 
probability that is randomly  generated between  zero and one. Fig. 14 shows the 
predicted  number  of exposed consumers  for varying  critical  doses. As expected, 
a higher critical  dose results  in a lower predicted  number  of exposed consumers. 
For Model 1, these modeling variations result  in significant differences in the re- 
sults.  For Models 2-5 at the West  Treatment Plant for the 300-kg arsenic event 
(Fig. 14b), using the homogeneous population under-predicts the number  of ex- 
posed consumers, even when compared  to results corresponding  to a critical dose 
of 0.0710  mg   body weight.  For  events  at  the  East  Treatment Plant, simulating 
a homogeneous  population matches  more closely the  heterogeneous  population 
with a critical  dose of 0.05  mg   body weight. The dynamics  of the more extreme 
events  (Figs. 14b and d) exacerbates the unpredictability of model results. 
 
 
 
 
7.2     Word-of-Mouth Framework 
 
 
The modeling structure that is adopted for the word-of-mouth mechanism  may 
also significantly  impact  the  predicted  number  of exposed consumers.  Parame- 
ters in the word-of-mouth framework that can be investigated include the cluster 
size and the number  of intermediate members. Analysis demonstrated that vary- 
ing the number  of intermediate members does not impact  the number  of exposed 
consumers  in the range of two to eight, when the size of the cluster  is kept  con- 
stant at  15. Varying  the  size of the  cluster,  however, can significantly  alter  the 
results  (Fig.  15). As the  number  of members  in a cluster  increases,  more indi- 
viduals  will be informed  of an  event and  change  their  water  use,  resulting  in 
fewer exposed consumers.  The number  of exposed consumers  is reduced  by 50% 
as the  cluster  size increases  from 10 to 30, indicating  that results  may  be sig- 
nificantly  sensitive  to the  word-of-mouth simulation. The  parameters that best 
represent the community structure and communication characteristics of a pop- 
ulation  should be identified to facilitate  a better understanding of the dynamics 
that may occur in an event. 
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Fig. 14.  Consumer response  curves  for the  heterogeneous population simulated with 
various  critical  doses compared to the  base  case of a homogeneous population. Simu- 
lated  for (a) 75-kg arsenic  event at the West  Treatment Plant; (b) 300-kg arsenic  event 
at the West  Treatment Plant; (c) 75-kg arsenic  event at the East  Treatment Plant; and 
(d)  300-kg arsenic  event at the  East  Treatment Plant. 
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Fig. 15.  Number of consumers who change  their  water  use and  the  number of exposed 
consumers for varying  cluster  sizes. 
 
 
 
 
8    Discussion and Conclusions 
 
An ABM framework  is described  and  demonstrated for simulating  contamina- 
tion  of water  distribution systems.  Sociotechnical  simulation  integrates model- 
ing of consumer  behavior  and a hydraulic  model of the pipe network  to predict 
the  number  of exposed consumers  for an event.  The ABM simulates  consumers 
as agents  with  mechanisms  for mobility,  word-of-mouth communication, prob- 
abilistic  estimations of the  volume  of water  ingestion,  and  probabilistic timing 
for water  ingestion.  The  research  presented here  makes  a new contribution to 
research  investigating the  significance of consumers  adapting their  demands  in 
event of a contamination through a comparison  of the  results  of the  sociotech- 
nical model with an engineering  and exposure  model alone (34; 35). Analysis is 
conducted  here to create  new understanding about  the simulation  of a dynamic 
event:  results  demonstrate the  spatial  and  temporal variation in consumer  de- 
mands  and  in the  movement  of the  contaminant  plume  as consumer  activities 
of increasing  complexity  (e.g., mobility  and communication) are included  in the 
simulation. New results  present  here  demonstrate that in some cases, adapta- 
tions  of consumer  demands  can  alter  the  predicted   hydraulics  of the  system, 
the  movement of the  contaminant plume,  and  as a result,  public  health  conse- 
quences.  Specifically, for potent events  that are isolated  in the  western  portion 
of the  city,  the  fluctuation of the  hydraulics  changes  the  flow directions  in the 
network from normal operations and breaks a hydraulic  barrier,  which leads to a 
higher number  of exposures. The simulation  approach that is developed here can 
benefit  utility  managers  and  public health  officials in developing  plans  for mit- 
igating  consequences  of contamination events.  Specifically, managers  can  gain 
insights  to  the  potential dynamics  that can  influence  the  direction  and  flows 
of water  in the  system.  Vulnerability analysis  that is conducted  by considering 
an engineering  model in isolation  may mis-identify  the  worst-case  scenarios for 
contaminant intrusion, and  response  plans  that are  developed  without consid- 
eration  of adaptive behaviors  may disregard  important dynamics  that influence 
the performance  of selected protective actions. 
 
This  study  also develops  a new metric  for evaluating the  movement of the 
plume and the population within the network. The Coincident Population Plume 
index is defined to represent the  movement of polluted  water  to nodes that are 
highly populated, and  it can be used to evaluate  the  change  in the  plume  due 
to adaptations of consumer  behaviors.  The index gives a concise metric  for dis- 
playing the change in the vulnerable  population based on additional complexity 
in the  model.  For  this  study,  values  of the  index  illustrate that models  of in- 
creasing complexity  predict  that the polluted  water is available  to a wider range 
of consumers.  By including  accurate  representations of the  complex sociotech- 
nical  interactions, more  conservative  predictions of consumer  exposure  can  be 
obtained. The results of this modeling framework can lead to better understand- 
ing of the impact of events on public health  and to better selection of components 
that should be hardened and mitigation strategies. 
 
 
 
 
This study  also improved  the simulation  of consumer  behavior  beyond what 
has  been implemented previously  to  provide  a more  realistic  representation of 
the potential behaviors  of individuals.  Much of this behavioral  simulation  is still 
rudimentary, however, especially regarding  the  reactions  of consumers  to expo- 
sure and information about  a threat. For example,  the simulation  assumes  that 
consumers  respond within  one hour of becoming exposed or receiving a warning 
from  a  peer.  Previous  work  demonstrated that the  emergent  consumer  expo- 
sure  is sensitive  to  timing  information (40).  New information is needed  from 
social science studies  about  the  timing  and  risk-aversion  of consumer  reactions 
to hazards,  sickness due to specific contaminants, and public warnings,  to better 
conceptualize  and parameterize the model. 
 
Finally, this research conducted  a sensitivity analysis to explore the influence 
of the  social model on the  predicted  consequences.  The  analysis  demonstrated 
that the cluster  modeling assumptions and settings  could significantly  influence 
the predicted  results.  New research  for modeling and parameterizing social net- 
works and their functions in hazards  can be incorporated, as it becomes available, 
in the  ABM framework.  Beyond  the  research  demonstrated here, the  modeling 
can be enhanced  through inclusion  of information about  consumer  response  to 
different types of media and warning messages, and consumer response to symp- 
toms.  The  dissemination of warning  notices  by utility  managers  and  how they 
influence the adoption of protective actions  are not part  of this modeling study, 
but  are investigated in on-going work (41). 
 
The  sociotechnical  simulation  developed  here forms a bridge  to connect  re- 
search  conducted   in  behavioral   science  with  engineering  management.  ABM 
provides  an approach to incorporate probabilistic information about  consumer 
choices with hydraulic  simulation. Additional research can investigate the extent 
to which social networks  and  engineering  preparedness determine the  resilience 
of a community to hazardous events.  Additional agents  can be defined to rep- 
resent utility  managers,  media,  and public health  officials to capture additional 
dynamics  due  to  human  behavior  and  errors.  An extended  framework  can  be 
developed  and  is being investigated to evaluate  the  effectiveness of alternative 
response actions  that can be selected by public officials, as response actions  can 
include a wide range of hydraulic  and social response, such as opening hydrants 
and  closing pipes (19); and  warning  consumers  through media  and  emergency 
siren vehicles (42). 
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